libwebsockets/lib/jose/jwe/jwe-rsa-aescbc.c
2024-11-03 07:59:12 +00:00

197 lines
6.1 KiB
C

/*
* libwebsockets - small server side websockets and web server implementation
*
* Copyright (C) 2010 - 2020 Andy Green <andy@warmcat.com>
*
* Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
* of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to
* deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the
* rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or
* sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
* furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
*
* The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
* all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
* FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
* AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
* LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING
* FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS
* IN THE SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "private-lib-core.h"
#include "private-lib-jose-jwe.h"
/*
* Requirements on entry:
*
* - jwe->jws.map LJWE_JOSE contains the ASCII JOSE header
* - jwe->jws.map LJWE_EKEY contains cek of enc_alg hmac length
* - jwe->jws.map LJWE_CTXT contains the plaintext
*
* On successful exit:
*
* - jwe->jws.map LJWE_ATAG contains the tag
* - jwe->jws.map LJWE_IV contains the new random IV that was used
* - jwe->jws.map LJWE_EKEY contains the encrypted CEK
* - jwe->jws.map LJWE_CTXT contains the ciphertext
*
* Return the amount of temp used, or -1
*/
int
lws_jwe_encrypt_rsa_aes_cbc_hs(struct lws_jwe *jwe,
char *temp, int *temp_len)
{
int n, hlen = (int)lws_genhmac_size(jwe->jose.enc_alg->hmac_type),
ot = *temp_len;
char ekey[LWS_GENHASH_LARGEST];
struct lws_genrsa_ctx rsactx;
if (jwe->jws.jwk->kty != LWS_GENCRYPTO_KTY_RSA) {
lwsl_err("%s: unexpected kty %d\n", __func__, jwe->jws.jwk->kty);
return -1;
}
/*
* Notice that the unencrypted EKEY coming in is smaller than the
* RSA-encrypted EKEY going out, which is going to be the RSA key size
*
* Create a b64 version of the JOSE header, needed as aad
*/
if (lws_jws_encode_b64_element(&jwe->jws.map_b64, LJWE_JOSE,
temp, temp_len,
jwe->jws.map.buf[LJWE_JOSE],
jwe->jws.map.len[LJWE_JOSE]))
return -1;
if (lws_jws_alloc_element(&jwe->jws.map, LJWE_ATAG, temp + (ot - *temp_len),
temp_len, (unsigned int)hlen / 2, 0))
return -1;
if (lws_jws_alloc_element(&jwe->jws.map, LJWE_IV, temp + (ot - *temp_len),
temp_len, LWS_JWE_AES_IV_BYTES, 0))
return -1;
/*
* Without changing the unencrypted CEK in EKEY, reallocate enough
* space to write the RSA-encrypted version in-situ.
*/
if (lws_jws_dup_element(&jwe->jws.map, LJWE_EKEY, temp + (ot - *temp_len),
temp_len, jwe->jws.map.buf[LJWE_EKEY],
jwe->jws.map.len[LJWE_EKEY],
jwe->jws.jwk->e[LWS_GENCRYPTO_RSA_KEYEL_N].len))
return -1;
/* Encrypt using the raw CEK (treated as MAC KEY | ENC KEY) */
n = lws_jwe_encrypt_cbc_hs(jwe, (uint8_t *)jwe->jws.map.buf[LJWE_EKEY],
(uint8_t *)jwe->jws.map_b64.buf[LJWE_JOSE],
(int)jwe->jws.map_b64.len[LJWE_JOSE]);
if (n < 0) {
lwsl_err("%s: lws_jwe_encrypt_cbc_hs failed\n", __func__);
return -1;
}
if (lws_genrsa_create(&rsactx, jwe->jws.jwk->e, jwe->jws.context,
!strcmp(jwe->jose.alg->alg, "RSA-OAEP") ?
LGRSAM_PKCS1_OAEP_PSS : LGRSAM_PKCS1_1_5,
LWS_GENHASH_TYPE_UNKNOWN)) {
lwsl_notice("%s: lws_genrsa_create\n",
__func__);
return -1;
}
/* encrypt the CEK using RSA, mbedtls can't handle both in and out are
* the EKEY, so copy the unencrypted ekey out temporarily */
memcpy(ekey, jwe->jws.map.buf[LJWE_EKEY], (unsigned int)hlen);
n = lws_genrsa_public_encrypt(&rsactx, (uint8_t *)ekey, (unsigned int)hlen,
(uint8_t *)jwe->jws.map.buf[LJWE_EKEY]);
lws_genrsa_destroy(&rsactx);
lws_explicit_bzero(ekey, (unsigned int)hlen); /* cleanse the temp CEK copy */
if (n < 0) {
lwsl_err("%s: encrypt cek fail\n", __func__);
return -1;
}
jwe->jws.map.len[LJWE_EKEY] = (unsigned int)n; /* update to encrypted EKEY size */
/*
* We end up with IV, ATAG, set, EKEY encrypted and CTXT is ciphertext,
* and b64u version of ATAG in map_b64.
*/
return 0;
}
int
lws_jwe_auth_and_decrypt_rsa_aes_cbc_hs(struct lws_jwe *jwe)
{
int n;
struct lws_genrsa_ctx rsactx;
uint8_t enc_cek[512];
if (jwe->jws.jwk->kty != LWS_GENCRYPTO_KTY_RSA) {
lwsl_err("%s: unexpected kty %d\n", __func__, jwe->jws.jwk->kty);
return -1;
}
if (jwe->jws.map.len[LJWE_EKEY] < 40) {
lwsl_err("%s: EKEY length too short %d\n", __func__,
(int)jwe->jws.map.len[LJWE_EKEY]);
return -1;
}
/* Decrypt the JWE Encrypted Key to get the raw MAC || CEK */
if (lws_genrsa_create(&rsactx, jwe->jws.jwk->e, jwe->jws.context,
!strcmp(jwe->jose.alg->alg, "RSA-OAEP") ?
LGRSAM_PKCS1_OAEP_PSS : LGRSAM_PKCS1_1_5,
LWS_GENHASH_TYPE_UNKNOWN)) {
lwsl_notice("%s: lws_genrsa_public_decrypt_create\n",
__func__);
return -1;
}
n = lws_genrsa_private_decrypt(&rsactx,
(uint8_t *)jwe->jws.map.buf[LJWE_EKEY],
jwe->jws.map.len[LJWE_EKEY], enc_cek,
sizeof(enc_cek));
lws_genrsa_destroy(&rsactx);
if (n < 0) {
lwsl_err("%s: decrypt cek fail: \n", __func__);
return -1;
}
n = lws_jwe_auth_and_decrypt_cbc_hs(jwe, enc_cek,
(uint8_t *)jwe->jws.map_b64.buf[LJWE_JOSE],
(int)jwe->jws.map_b64.len[LJWE_JOSE]);
if (n < 0) {
lwsl_err("%s: lws_jwe_auth_and_decrypt_cbc_hs failed\n",
__func__);
return -1;
}
#if defined(LWS_WITH_MBEDTLS) && defined(LWS_PLAT_OPTEE)
/* strip padding */
n = jwe->jws.map.buf[LJWE_CTXT][jwe->jws.map.len[LJWE_CTXT] - 1];
if (n > 16) {
lwsl_err("%s: n == %d, plen %d\n", __func__, n,
(int)jwe->jws.map.len[LJWE_CTXT]);
return -1;
}
jwe->jws.map.len[LJWE_CTXT] -= n;
#endif
return (int)jwe->jws.map.len[LJWE_CTXT];
}