libwebsockets/plugins/ssh-base/kex-25519.c
Andy Green c9731c5f17 type comparisons: fixes
This is a huge patch that should be a global NOP.

For unix type platforms it enables -Wconversion to issue warnings (-> error)
for all automatic casts that seem less than ideal but are normally concealed
by the toolchain.

This is things like passing an int to a size_t argument.  Once enabled, I
went through all args on my default build (which build most things) and
tried to make the removed default cast explicit.

With that approach it neither change nor bloat the code, since it compiles
to whatever it was doing before, just with the casts made explicit... in a
few cases I changed some length args from int to size_t but largely left
the causes alone.

From now on, new code that is relying on less than ideal casting
will complain and nudge me to improve it by warnings.
2021-01-05 10:56:38 +00:00

552 lines
14 KiB
C

/*
* libwebsockets - small server side websockets and web server implementation
*
* Copyright (C) 2010 - 2019 Andy Green <andy@warmcat.com>
*
* Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
* of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to
* deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the
* rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or
* sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
* furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
*
* The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
* all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
* FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
* AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
* LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING
* FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS
* IN THE SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "libwebsockets.h"
#include "lws-ssh.h"
#include <string.h>
/*
* ssh-keygen -t ed25519
* head -n-1 srv-key-25519 | tail -n +2 | base64 -d | hexdump -C
*/
static void
lws_sized_blob(uint8_t **p, void *blob, uint32_t len)
{
lws_p32((*p), len);
*p += 4;
memcpy(*p, blob, len);
*p += len;
}
static const char key_leadin[] = "openssh-key-v1\x00\x00\x00\x00\x04none"
"\x00\x00\x00\x04none\x00"
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x33"
"\x00\x00\x00\x0bssh-ed25519\x00\x00\x00\x20",
key_sep[] = "\x00\x00\x00\x90\xb1\x4f\xa7\x28"
"\xb1\x4f\xa7\x28\x00\x00\x00\x0bssh-ed25519"
"\x00\x00\x00\x20",
key_privl[] = "\x00\x00\x00\x40",
key_trail[] = "\x00\x00\x00\x0cself-gen@cbl\x01";
static size_t
lws_gen_server_key_ed25519(struct lws_context *context, uint8_t *buf256,
size_t max_len)
{
uint8_t *p = buf256 + sizeof(key_leadin) - 1;
if (max_len < sizeof(key_leadin) - 1 + 32 + sizeof(key_sep) - 1 + 32 +
sizeof(key_privl) - 1 + 64 + sizeof(key_trail) - 1)
return 0;
memcpy(buf256, key_leadin, sizeof(key_leadin) - 1);
crypto_sign_ed25519_keypair(context, p, p + 32 + sizeof(key_sep) - 1 +
32 + sizeof(key_privl) - 1);
memcpy(p + 32 + sizeof(key_sep) - 1, p, 32);
p += 32;
memcpy(p, key_sep, sizeof(key_sep) - 1);
p += sizeof(key_sep) - 1 + 32;
memcpy(p, key_privl, sizeof(key_privl) - 1);
p += sizeof(key_privl) - 1 + 64;
memcpy(p, key_trail, sizeof(key_trail) - 1);
p += sizeof(key_trail) - 1;
lwsl_notice("%s: Generated key len %ld\n", __func__, (long)(p - buf256));
return (size_t)(p - buf256);
}
static int
lws_mpint_rfc4251(uint8_t *dest, const uint8_t *src, int bytes, int uns)
{
uint8_t *odest = dest;
while (!*src && bytes > 1) {
src++;
bytes--;
}
if (!*src) {
*dest++ = 0;
*dest++ = 0;
*dest++ = 0;
*dest++ = 0;
return 4;
}
if (uns && (*src) & 0x80)
bytes++;
*dest++ = (uint8_t)(bytes >> 24);
*dest++ = (uint8_t)(bytes >> 16);
*dest++ = (uint8_t)(bytes >> 8);
*dest++ = (uint8_t)(bytes);
if (uns && (*src) & 0x80) {
*dest++ = 0;
bytes--;
}
while (bytes--)
*dest++ = *src++;
return lws_ptr_diff(dest, odest);
}
int
ed25519_key_parse(uint8_t *p, size_t len, char *type, size_t type_len,
uint8_t *pub, uint8_t *pri)
{
uint32_t l, publ, m;
uint8_t *op = p;
if (len < 180)
return 1;
if (memcmp(p, "openssh-key-v1", 14))
return 2;
p += 15;
l = lws_g32(&p); /* ciphername */
if (l != 4 || memcmp(p, "none", 4))
return 3;
p += l;
l = lws_g32(&p); /* kdfname */
if (l != 4 || memcmp(p, "none", 4))
return 4;
p += l;
l = lws_g32(&p); /* kdfoptions */
if (l)
return 5;
l = lws_g32(&p); /* number of keys */
if (l != 1)
return 6;
publ = lws_g32(&p); /* length of pubkey block */
if ((size_t)((uint32_t)(p - op) + publ) >= len)
return 7;
l = lws_g32(&p); /* key type length */
if (l > 31)
return 8;
m = l;
if (m >= type_len)
m = (uint32_t)type_len -1 ;
lws_strncpy(type, (const char *)p, m + 1);
p += l;
l = lws_g32(&p); /* pub key length */
if (l != 32)
return 10;
p += l;
publ = lws_g32(&p); /* length of private key block */
if ((size_t)((uint32_t)(p - op) + publ) != len)
return 11;
l = lws_g32(&p); /* checkint 1 */
if (lws_g32(&p) != l) /* must match checkint 2 */
return 12;
l = lws_g32(&p); /* key type length */
p += l;
l = lws_g32(&p); /* public key part length */
if (l != LWS_SIZE_EC25519_PUBKEY)
return 15;
if (pub)
memcpy(pub, p, LWS_SIZE_EC25519_PUBKEY);
p += l;
l = lws_g32(&p); /* private key part length */
if (l != LWS_SIZE_EC25519_PRIKEY)
return 16;
if (pri)
memcpy(pri, p, LWS_SIZE_EC25519_PRIKEY);
return 0;
}
static int
_genhash_update_len(struct lws_genhash_ctx *ctx, const void *input, size_t ilen)
{
uint32_t be;
lws_p32((uint8_t *)&be, (uint32_t)ilen);
if (lws_genhash_update(ctx, (uint8_t *)&be, 4))
return 1;
if (lws_genhash_update(ctx, input, ilen))
return 1;
return 0;
}
static int
kex_ecdh_dv(uint8_t *dest, int dest_len, const uint8_t *kbi, int kbi_len,
const uint8_t *H, char c, const uint8_t *session_id)
{
uint8_t pool[LWS_SIZE_SHA256];
struct lws_genhash_ctx ctx;
int n = 0, m;
/*
* Key data MUST be taken from the beginning of the hash output.
* As many bytes as needed are taken from the beginning of the hash
* value.
*
* If the key length needed is longer than the output of the HASH,
* the key is extended by computing HASH of the concatenation of K
* and H and the entire key so far, and appending the resulting
* bytes (as many as HASH generates) to the key. This process is
* repeated until enough key material is available; the key is taken
* from the beginning of this value. In other words:
*
* K1 = HASH(K || H || X || session_id) (X is e.g., "A")
* K2 = HASH(K || H || K1)
* K3 = HASH(K || H || K1 || K2)
* ...
* key = K1 || K2 || K3 || ...
*/
while (n < dest_len) {
if (lws_genhash_init(&ctx, LWS_GENHASH_TYPE_SHA256))
return 1;
if (lws_genhash_update(&ctx, kbi, (unsigned int)kbi_len))
goto hash_failed;
if (lws_genhash_update(&ctx, H, LWS_SIZE_SHA256))
goto hash_failed;
if (!n) {
if (lws_genhash_update(&ctx, (void *)&c, 1))
goto hash_failed;
if (lws_genhash_update(&ctx, session_id,
LWS_SIZE_EC25519))
goto hash_failed;
} else
if (lws_genhash_update(&ctx, pool, LWS_SIZE_EC25519))
goto hash_failed;
lws_genhash_destroy(&ctx, pool);
m = LWS_SIZE_EC25519;
if (m > (dest_len - n))
m = dest_len - n;
memcpy(dest, pool, (unsigned int)m);
n += m;
dest += m;
}
return 0;
hash_failed:
lws_genhash_destroy(&ctx, NULL);
return 1;
}
static const unsigned char basepoint[32] = { 9 };
size_t
get_gen_server_key_25519(struct per_session_data__sshd *pss, uint8_t *b,
size_t len)
{
size_t s, mylen;
mylen = pss->vhd->ops->get_server_key(pss->wsi, b, len);
if (mylen)
return mylen;
/* create one then */
lwsl_notice("Generating server hostkey\n");
s = lws_gen_server_key_ed25519(pss->vhd->context, b, len);
lwsl_notice(" gen key len %ld\n", (long)s);
if (!s)
return 0;
/* set the key */
if (!pss->vhd->ops->set_server_key(pss->wsi, b, s))
return 0;
/* new key stored OK */
return s;
}
int
kex_ecdh(struct per_session_data__sshd *pss, uint8_t *reply, uint32_t *plen)
{
uint8_t pri_key[64], temp[64], payload_sig[64 + 32], a, *lp, kbi[64];
struct lws_kex *kex = pss->kex;
struct lws_genhash_ctx ctx;
unsigned long long smlen;
uint8_t *p = reply + 5;
uint32_t be, kbi_len;
uint8_t servkey[256];
char keyt[33];
int r, c;
r = (int)get_gen_server_key_25519(pss, servkey, (int)sizeof(servkey));
if (!r) {
lwsl_err("%s: Failed to get or gen server key\n", __func__);
return 1;
}
r = ed25519_key_parse(servkey, (unsigned int)r, keyt, sizeof(keyt),
pss->K_S /* public key */, pri_key);
if (r) {
lwsl_notice("%s: server key parse failed: %d\n", __func__, r);
return 1;
}
keyt[32] = '\0';
lwsl_info("Server key type: %s\n", keyt);
/*
* 1) Generate ephemeral key pair [ eph_pri_key | kex->Q_S ]
* 2) Compute shared secret.
* 3) Generate and sign exchange hash.
*
* 1) A 32 bytes private key should be generated for each new
* connection, using a secure PRNG. The following actions
* must be done on the private key:
*
* mysecret[0] &= 248;
* mysecret[31] &= 127;
* mysecret[31] |= 64;
*/
lws_get_random(pss->vhd->context, kex->eph_pri_key, LWS_SIZE_EC25519);
kex->eph_pri_key[0] &= 248;
kex->eph_pri_key[31] &= 127;
kex->eph_pri_key[31] |= 64;
/*
* 2) The public key is calculated using the cryptographic scalar
* multiplication:
*
* const unsigned char privkey[32];
* unsigned char pubkey[32];
*
* crypto_scalarmult (pubkey, privkey, basepoint);
*/
crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(kex->Q_S, kex->eph_pri_key, basepoint);
a = 0;
for (r = 0; r < (int)sizeof(kex->Q_S); r++)
a |= kex->Q_S[r];
if (!a) {
lwsl_notice("all zero pubkey\n");
return SSH_DISCONNECT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILED;
}
/*
* The shared secret, k, is defined in SSH specifications to be a big
* integer. This number is calculated using the following procedure:
*
* X is the 32 bytes point obtained by the scalar multiplication of
* the other side's public key and the local private key scalar.
*/
crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(pss->K, kex->eph_pri_key, kex->Q_C);
/*
* The whole 32 bytes of the number X are then converted into a big
* integer k. This conversion follows the network byte order. This
* step differs from RFC5656.
*/
kbi_len = (uint32_t)lws_mpint_rfc4251(kbi, pss->K, LWS_SIZE_EC25519, 1);
/*
* The exchange hash H is computed as the hash of the concatenation of
* the following:
*
* string V_C, the client's identification string (CR and LF
* excluded)
* string V_S, the server's identification string (CR and LF
* excluded)
* string I_C, the payload of the client's SSH_MSG_KEXINIT
* string I_S, the payload of the server's SSH_MSG_KEXINIT
* string K_S, the host key
* mpint Q_C, exchange value sent by the client
* mpint Q_S, exchange value sent by the server
* mpint K, the shared secret
*
* However there are a lot of unwritten details in the hash
* definition...
*/
if (lws_genhash_init(&ctx, LWS_GENHASH_TYPE_SHA256)) {
lwsl_notice("genhash init failed\n");
return 1;
}
if (_genhash_update_len(&ctx, pss->V_C, strlen(pss->V_C)))
goto hash_probs;
if (_genhash_update_len(&ctx, pss->vhd->ops->server_string, /* aka V_S */
strlen(pss->vhd->ops->server_string)))
goto hash_probs;
if (_genhash_update_len(&ctx, kex->I_C, kex->I_C_payload_len))
goto hash_probs;
if (_genhash_update_len(&ctx, kex->I_S, kex->I_S_payload_len))
goto hash_probs;
/*
* K_S (host public key)
*
* sum of name + key lengths and headers
* name length: name
* key length: key
* ---> */
lws_p32((uint8_t *)&be, (uint32_t)(8 + (int)strlen(keyt) + LWS_SIZE_EC25519));
if (lws_genhash_update(&ctx, (void *)&be, 4))
goto hash_probs;
if (_genhash_update_len(&ctx, keyt, strlen(keyt)))
goto hash_probs;
if (_genhash_update_len(&ctx, pss->K_S, LWS_SIZE_EC25519))
goto hash_probs;
/* <---- */
if (_genhash_update_len(&ctx, kex->Q_C, LWS_SIZE_EC25519))
goto hash_probs;
if (_genhash_update_len(&ctx, kex->Q_S, LWS_SIZE_EC25519))
goto hash_probs;
if (lws_genhash_update(&ctx, kbi, kbi_len))
goto hash_probs;
if (lws_genhash_destroy(&ctx, temp))
goto hash_probs;
/*
* Sign the 32-byte SHA256 "exchange hash" in temp
* The signature is itself 64 bytes
*/
smlen = LWS_SIZE_EC25519 + 64;
if (crypto_sign_ed25519(payload_sig, &smlen, temp, LWS_SIZE_EC25519,
pri_key))
return 1;
#if 0
l = LWS_SIZE_EC25519;
n = crypto_sign_ed25519_open(temp, &l, payload_sig, smlen, pss->K_S);
lwsl_notice("own sig sanity check says %d\n", n);
#endif
/* sig [64] and payload [32] concatenated in payload_sig
*
* The server then responds with the following
*
* uint32 packet length (exl self + mac)
* byte padding len
* byte SSH_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY
* string server public host key and certificates (K_S)
* string Q_S (exchange value sent by the server)
* string signature of H
* padding
*/
*p++ = SSH_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY;
/* server public host key and certificates (K_S) */
lp = p;
p +=4;
lws_sized_blob(&p, keyt, (uint32_t)strlen(keyt));
lws_sized_blob(&p, pss->K_S, LWS_SIZE_EC25519);
lws_p32(lp, (uint32_t)(lws_ptr_diff(p, lp) - 4));
/* Q_S (exchange value sent by the server) */
lws_sized_blob(&p, kex->Q_S, LWS_SIZE_EC25519);
/* signature of H */
lp = p;
p +=4;
lws_sized_blob(&p, keyt, (uint32_t)strlen(keyt));
lws_sized_blob(&p, payload_sig, 64);
lws_p32(lp, (uint32_t)(lws_ptr_diff(p, lp) - 4));
/* end of message */
lws_pad_set_length(pss, reply, &p, &pss->active_keys_stc);
*plen = (uint32_t)lws_ptr_diff(p, reply);
if (!pss->active_keys_stc.valid)
memcpy(pss->session_id, temp, LWS_SIZE_EC25519);
/* RFC4253 7.2:
*
* The key exchange produces two values: a shared secret K,
* and an exchange hash H. Encryption and authentication
* keys are derived from these. The exchange hash H from the
* first key exchange is additionally used as the session
* identifier, which is a unique identifier for this connection.
* It is used by authentication methods as a part of the data
* that is signed as a proof of possession of a private key.
* Once computed, the session identifier is not changed,
* even if keys are later re-exchanged.
*
* The hash alg used in the KEX must be used for key derivation.
*
* 1) Initial IV client to server:
*
* HASH(K || H || "A" || session_id)
*
* (Here K is encoded as mpint and "A" as byte and session_id
* as raw data. "A" means the single character A, ASCII 65).
*
*
*/
for (c = 0; c < 3; c++) {
kex_ecdh_dv(kex->keys_next_cts.key[c], LWS_SIZE_CHACHA256_KEY,
kbi, (int)kbi_len, temp, (char)('A' + (c * 2)),
pss->session_id);
kex_ecdh_dv(kex->keys_next_stc.key[c], LWS_SIZE_CHACHA256_KEY,
kbi, (int)kbi_len, temp, (char)('B' + (c * 2)),
pss->session_id);
}
lws_explicit_bzero(temp, sizeof(temp));
return 0;
hash_probs:
lws_genhash_destroy(&ctx, NULL);
return 1;
}