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slackhq_nebula/outside.go
Wade Simmons 949ec78653
don't set ConnectionState to nil (#590)
* don't set ConnectionState to nil

We might have packets processing in another thread, so we can't safely
just set this to nil. Since we removed it from the hostmaps, the next
packets to process should start the handshake over again.

I believe this comment is outdated or incorrect, since the next
handshake will start over with a new HostInfo, I don't think there is
any way a counter reuse could happen:

> We must null the connectionstate or a counter reuse may happen

Here is a panic we saw that I think is related:

    panic: runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference
    [signal SIGSEGV: segmentation violation code=0x1 addr=0x20 pc=0x93a037]
    goroutine 59 [running, locked to thread]:
    github.com/slackhq/nebula.(*Firewall).Drop(...)
            github.com/slackhq/nebula/firewall.go:380
    github.com/slackhq/nebula.(*Interface).consumeInsidePacket(...)
            github.com/slackhq/nebula/inside.go:59
    github.com/slackhq/nebula.(*Interface).listenIn(...)
            github.com/slackhq/nebula/interface.go:233
    created by github.com/slackhq/nebula.(*Interface).run
            github.com/slackhq/nebula/interface.go:191

* use closeTunnel
2021-12-06 14:09:05 -05:00

418 lines
12 KiB
Go

package nebula
import (
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"fmt"
"time"
"github.com/flynn/noise"
"github.com/golang/protobuf/proto"
"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/firewall"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/iputil"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
"golang.org/x/net/ipv4"
)
const (
minFwPacketLen = 4
)
func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(addr *udp.Addr, out []byte, packet []byte, h *header.H, fwPacket *firewall.Packet, lhf udp.LightHouseHandlerFunc, nb []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) {
err := h.Parse(packet)
if err != nil {
// TODO: best if we return this and let caller log
// TODO: Might be better to send the literal []byte("holepunch") packet and ignore that?
// Hole punch packets are 0 or 1 byte big, so lets ignore printing those errors
if len(packet) > 1 {
f.l.WithField("packet", packet).Infof("Error while parsing inbound packet from %s: %s", addr, err)
}
return
}
//l.Error("in packet ", header, packet[HeaderLen:])
// verify if we've seen this index before, otherwise respond to the handshake initiation
hostinfo, err := f.hostMap.QueryIndex(h.RemoteIndex)
var ci *ConnectionState
if err == nil {
ci = hostinfo.ConnectionState
}
switch h.Type {
case header.Message:
if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, addr, h) {
return
}
f.decryptToTun(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, out, packet, fwPacket, nb, q, localCache)
// Fallthrough to the bottom to record incoming traffic
case header.LightHouse:
f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, addr, h) {
return
}
d, err := f.decrypt(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, out, packet, h, nb)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithError(err).WithField("udpAddr", addr).
WithField("packet", packet).
Error("Failed to decrypt lighthouse packet")
//TODO: maybe after build 64 is out? 06/14/2018 - NB
//f.sendRecvError(net.Addr(addr), header.RemoteIndex)
return
}
lhf(addr, hostinfo.vpnIp, d, f)
// Fallthrough to the bottom to record incoming traffic
case header.Test:
f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, addr, h) {
return
}
d, err := f.decrypt(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, out, packet, h, nb)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithError(err).WithField("udpAddr", addr).
WithField("packet", packet).
Error("Failed to decrypt test packet")
//TODO: maybe after build 64 is out? 06/14/2018 - NB
//f.sendRecvError(net.Addr(addr), header.RemoteIndex)
return
}
if h.Subtype == header.TestRequest {
// This testRequest might be from TryPromoteBest, so we should roam
// to the new IP address before responding
f.handleHostRoaming(hostinfo, addr)
f.send(header.Test, header.TestReply, ci, hostinfo, hostinfo.remote, d, nb, out)
}
// Fallthrough to the bottom to record incoming traffic
// Non encrypted messages below here, they should not fall through to avoid tracking incoming traffic since they
// are unauthenticated
case header.Handshake:
f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
HandleIncomingHandshake(f, addr, packet, h, hostinfo)
return
case header.RecvError:
f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
f.handleRecvError(addr, h)
return
case header.CloseTunnel:
f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, addr, h) {
return
}
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithField("udpAddr", addr).
Info("Close tunnel received, tearing down.")
f.closeTunnel(hostinfo, false)
return
default:
f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debugf("Unexpected packet received from %s", addr)
return
}
f.handleHostRoaming(hostinfo, addr)
f.connectionManager.In(hostinfo.vpnIp)
}
// closeTunnel closes a tunnel locally, it does not send a closeTunnel packet to the remote
func (f *Interface) closeTunnel(hostInfo *HostInfo, hasHostMapLock bool) {
//TODO: this would be better as a single function in ConnectionManager that handled locks appropriately
f.connectionManager.ClearIP(hostInfo.vpnIp)
f.connectionManager.ClearPendingDeletion(hostInfo.vpnIp)
f.lightHouse.DeleteVpnIp(hostInfo.vpnIp)
if hasHostMapLock {
f.hostMap.unlockedDeleteHostInfo(hostInfo)
} else {
f.hostMap.DeleteHostInfo(hostInfo)
}
}
// sendCloseTunnel is a helper function to send a proper close tunnel packet to a remote
func (f *Interface) sendCloseTunnel(h *HostInfo) {
f.send(header.CloseTunnel, 0, h.ConnectionState, h, h.remote, []byte{}, make([]byte, 12, 12), make([]byte, mtu))
}
func (f *Interface) handleHostRoaming(hostinfo *HostInfo, addr *udp.Addr) {
if !hostinfo.remote.Equals(addr) {
if !f.lightHouse.remoteAllowList.Allow(hostinfo.vpnIp, addr.IP) {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithField("newAddr", addr).Debug("lighthouse.remote_allow_list denied roaming")
return
}
if !hostinfo.lastRoam.IsZero() && addr.Equals(hostinfo.lastRoamRemote) && time.Since(hostinfo.lastRoam) < RoamingSuppressSeconds*time.Second {
if f.l.Level >= logrus.DebugLevel {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithField("udpAddr", hostinfo.remote).WithField("newAddr", addr).
Debugf("Suppressing roam back to previous remote for %d seconds", RoamingSuppressSeconds)
}
return
}
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithField("udpAddr", hostinfo.remote).WithField("newAddr", addr).
Info("Host roamed to new udp ip/port.")
hostinfo.lastRoam = time.Now()
remoteCopy := *hostinfo.remote
hostinfo.lastRoamRemote = &remoteCopy
hostinfo.SetRemote(addr)
}
}
func (f *Interface) handleEncrypted(ci *ConnectionState, addr *udp.Addr, h *header.H) bool {
// If connectionstate exists and the replay protector allows, process packet
// Else, send recv errors for 300 seconds after a restart to allow fast reconnection.
if ci == nil || !ci.window.Check(f.l, h.MessageCounter) {
f.sendRecvError(addr, h.RemoteIndex)
return false
}
return true
}
// newPacket validates and parses the interesting bits for the firewall out of the ip and sub protocol headers
func newPacket(data []byte, incoming bool, fp *firewall.Packet) error {
// Do we at least have an ipv4 header worth of data?
if len(data) < ipv4.HeaderLen {
return fmt.Errorf("packet is less than %v bytes", ipv4.HeaderLen)
}
// Is it an ipv4 packet?
if int((data[0]>>4)&0x0f) != 4 {
return fmt.Errorf("packet is not ipv4, type: %v", int((data[0]>>4)&0x0f))
}
// Adjust our start position based on the advertised ip header length
ihl := int(data[0]&0x0f) << 2
// Well formed ip header length?
if ihl < ipv4.HeaderLen {
return fmt.Errorf("packet had an invalid header length: %v", ihl)
}
// Check if this is the second or further fragment of a fragmented packet.
flagsfrags := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[6:8])
fp.Fragment = (flagsfrags & 0x1FFF) != 0
// Firewall handles protocol checks
fp.Protocol = data[9]
// Accounting for a variable header length, do we have enough data for our src/dst tuples?
minLen := ihl
if !fp.Fragment && fp.Protocol != firewall.ProtoICMP {
minLen += minFwPacketLen
}
if len(data) < minLen {
return fmt.Errorf("packet is less than %v bytes, ip header len: %v", minLen, ihl)
}
// Firewall packets are locally oriented
if incoming {
fp.RemoteIP = iputil.Ip2VpnIp(data[12:16])
fp.LocalIP = iputil.Ip2VpnIp(data[16:20])
if fp.Fragment || fp.Protocol == firewall.ProtoICMP {
fp.RemotePort = 0
fp.LocalPort = 0
} else {
fp.RemotePort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[ihl : ihl+2])
fp.LocalPort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[ihl+2 : ihl+4])
}
} else {
fp.LocalIP = iputil.Ip2VpnIp(data[12:16])
fp.RemoteIP = iputil.Ip2VpnIp(data[16:20])
if fp.Fragment || fp.Protocol == firewall.ProtoICMP {
fp.RemotePort = 0
fp.LocalPort = 0
} else {
fp.LocalPort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[ihl : ihl+2])
fp.RemotePort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[ihl+2 : ihl+4])
}
}
return nil
}
func (f *Interface) decrypt(hostinfo *HostInfo, mc uint64, out []byte, packet []byte, h *header.H, nb []byte) ([]byte, error) {
var err error
out, err = hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.DecryptDanger(out, packet[:header.Len], packet[header.Len:], mc, nb)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if !hostinfo.ConnectionState.window.Update(f.l, mc) {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithField("header", h).
Debugln("dropping out of window packet")
return nil, errors.New("out of window packet")
}
return out, nil
}
func (f *Interface) decryptToTun(hostinfo *HostInfo, messageCounter uint64, out []byte, packet []byte, fwPacket *firewall.Packet, nb []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) {
var err error
out, err = hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.DecryptDanger(out, packet[:header.Len], packet[header.Len:], messageCounter, nb)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithError(err).Error("Failed to decrypt packet")
//TODO: maybe after build 64 is out? 06/14/2018 - NB
//f.sendRecvError(hostinfo.remote, header.RemoteIndex)
return
}
err = newPacket(out, true, fwPacket)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithError(err).WithField("packet", out).
Warnf("Error while validating inbound packet")
return
}
if !hostinfo.ConnectionState.window.Update(f.l, messageCounter) {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithField("fwPacket", fwPacket).
Debugln("dropping out of window packet")
return
}
dropReason := f.firewall.Drop(out, *fwPacket, true, hostinfo, f.caPool, localCache)
if dropReason != nil {
if f.l.Level >= logrus.DebugLevel {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithField("fwPacket", fwPacket).
WithField("reason", dropReason).
Debugln("dropping inbound packet")
}
return
}
f.connectionManager.In(hostinfo.vpnIp)
_, err = f.readers[q].Write(out)
if err != nil {
f.l.WithError(err).Error("Failed to write to tun")
}
}
func (f *Interface) sendRecvError(endpoint *udp.Addr, index uint32) {
f.messageMetrics.Tx(header.RecvError, 0, 1)
//TODO: this should be a signed message so we can trust that we should drop the index
b := header.Encode(make([]byte, header.Len), header.Version, header.RecvError, 0, index, 0)
f.outside.WriteTo(b, endpoint)
if f.l.Level >= logrus.DebugLevel {
f.l.WithField("index", index).
WithField("udpAddr", endpoint).
Debug("Recv error sent")
}
}
func (f *Interface) handleRecvError(addr *udp.Addr, h *header.H) {
if f.l.Level >= logrus.DebugLevel {
f.l.WithField("index", h.RemoteIndex).
WithField("udpAddr", addr).
Debug("Recv error received")
}
// First, clean up in the pending hostmap
f.handshakeManager.pendingHostMap.DeleteReverseIndex(h.RemoteIndex)
hostinfo, err := f.hostMap.QueryReverseIndex(h.RemoteIndex)
if err != nil {
f.l.Debugln(err, ": ", h.RemoteIndex)
return
}
hostinfo.Lock()
defer hostinfo.Unlock()
if !hostinfo.RecvErrorExceeded() {
return
}
if hostinfo.remote != nil && !hostinfo.remote.Equals(addr) {
f.l.Infoln("Someone spoofing recv_errors? ", addr, hostinfo.remote)
return
}
f.closeTunnel(hostinfo, false)
// We also delete it from pending hostmap to allow for
// fast reconnect.
f.handshakeManager.DeleteHostInfo(hostinfo)
}
/*
func (f *Interface) sendMeta(ci *ConnectionState, endpoint *net.UDPAddr, meta *NebulaMeta) {
if ci.eKey != nil {
//TODO: log error?
return
}
msg, err := proto.Marshal(meta)
if err != nil {
l.Debugln("failed to encode header")
}
c := ci.messageCounter
b := HeaderEncode(nil, Version, uint8(metadata), 0, hostinfo.remoteIndexId, c)
ci.messageCounter++
msg := ci.eKey.EncryptDanger(b, nil, msg, c)
//msg := ci.eKey.EncryptDanger(b, nil, []byte(fmt.Sprintf("%d", counter)), c)
f.outside.WriteTo(msg, endpoint)
}
*/
func RecombineCertAndValidate(h *noise.HandshakeState, rawCertBytes []byte, caPool *cert.NebulaCAPool) (*cert.NebulaCertificate, error) {
pk := h.PeerStatic()
if pk == nil {
return nil, errors.New("no peer static key was present")
}
if rawCertBytes == nil {
return nil, errors.New("provided payload was empty")
}
r := &cert.RawNebulaCertificate{}
err := proto.Unmarshal(rawCertBytes, r)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error unmarshaling cert: %s", err)
}
// If the Details are nil, just exit to avoid crashing
if r.Details == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("certificate did not contain any details")
}
r.Details.PublicKey = pk
recombined, err := proto.Marshal(r)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error while recombining certificate: %s", err)
}
c, _ := cert.UnmarshalNebulaCertificate(recombined)
isValid, err := c.Verify(time.Now(), caPool)
if err != nil {
return c, fmt.Errorf("certificate validation failed: %s", err)
} else if !isValid {
// This case should never happen but here's to defensive programming!
return c, errors.New("certificate validation failed but did not return an error")
}
return c, nil
}